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Common position agreed on Takeover Directive
by Julian Harris
A common position on the proposed 'Thirteenth 
Company Law Directive on Takeovers' was adopted by the 
Council of Ministers on 19 June 2000. Under the co- 
decision procedure the directive will now be sent to the 
European Parliament for a second reading which must be 
completed by the end of October. If, as seems likely, areas 
of disagreement arise between Parliament and Council, it 
will then be subject to conciliation procedures (see also 
Commission press release IP/00/633, 19 June, and 
memo/00/36). As a part of the EU's Financial Services 
Action Plan the directive is seen as an important element 
in achieving the target of a single market in financialo o o
services by 2005, set by the Lisbon European Summit.
The first proposal for the directive was presented in 
1989 and amended in 1990. The amended proposal 
included detailed provisions, such as the obligation to 
launch a full bid for 100 per cent of a target company's 
shares once a person acquired shares with more than one- 
third of the voting rights. The object of this was to ensureo o J
that minority shareholders were not excluded from the 
opportunity to sell their shares at an attractive bid price. 
Further detailed rules were proposed in areas including: 
the publication of bids; contents of offer documents and 
revision of bids; and general principles governing the 
conduct of takeovers.
In 1996 the Commission replaced previous proposals 
with a suggested framework directive which approached the 
issue in a different way. The framework directive established 
the same general proposals to govern the conduct of 
takeovers as were featured in the previous proposal, but 
omitted the detailed provisions which aimed to harmonise 
the manner in which these principles should be applied. 
Under the draft framewwk directive, member states' own 
rules on takeovers were required to respect a number of 
principles (including, for example, the requirement for the 
board of the target company to act in the interests of the 
company as a whole and not deny shareholders the 
opportunity to decide on the merits of the offer).
The directive was further amended in 1997, when the 
European Parliament decided that insufficient attention 
had been paid to the interests of employees. New rules 
were inserted requiring employees of target companies to 
be kept informed of bids, and for the offer .document to 
be made available to them. The rules on disclosure with 
regard to shareholders were widened to cover employees, 
and management required to take into account 
employment concerns when considering the interests of 
the company as a whole.
SOME KEY MEASURES:
(1) All investors holding the same class of shares must be 
equally treated, particularly when there is a change of 
control within the company (currently several member 
states do not require a full bid if control is transferred).
(2) Shareholders in the target company must be given 
enough time and sufficient information to enable themo
to reach a properly informed decision on the bid 
(currently some member states allow the target 
company to take defensive measures without the prior 
consent of shareholders).
(3) The board of the target company must act in the 
interests of the company as a whole and must not deny 
shareholders the opportunity to decide on the merits 
of the offer.
(4) False markets must not be created in the shares of the 
target company.
(5) The bid cannot be announced until the bidder has 
ensured that it can fulfil in full any cash consideration 
if offered and that it has taken all reasonable measures 
to ensure it can fulfil any other type of consideration.
(6) A takeover bid should not unreasonably hinder the 
operation of the target company.
The proposed directive is designed to ensure an 
adequate level of protection for minority shareholders 
across the EU in the case of a change of company control. 
To ensure this, member states are obliged to require that 
bidders in such cases make a full bid for all the shares at an 
equitable price.
Lawyers involved with the conduct and regulation of 
takeovers in the UK do not for the most part welcome the 
proposed directive because they feel that it is likely to create 
extra litigation and delay without giving much in return. 
Those responsible for the directive in its present form were 
much influenced by the quick and flexible system of self- 
regulation offered by the UK Takeover Code. It is not 
without irony that just before the common position was 
adopted on the directive, the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 received Royal Assent and established the Financial 
Services Authority as the statutory body with responsibility 
for takeover regulation. The panel's future effectiveness and 
authority has been greatly reduced as a result. @
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